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I.INTRODUCTION
The newly sworn Republican-controlled Congress has, as one of its
primary objectives, the downsizing of government. Speaker Newt Gingrich has
specically targeted the federal Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for the
conservative wrath.1 The political climate that led to the change in power in
Congress is partly based on the nation's anti-regulatory demeanor { the belief,
whether correct or mistaken, that the regulators have run riot, that there is
too much power in the hands of a few appointed bureaucrats. The FDA draws
specic attention because of the palpable eects of its rulings in the lives of all
citizens. Specically, the requirements for the pre-market approval of new drugs
have been criticized for being too cumbersome.2 This paper will attempt to draw
a compromise between the observed problem of overregulation in that area and
the still important policies underlying the federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act (FDCA). It will call for the elimination of the ecacy requirement for new
drug applications (NDA) as a way to reduce the costs of developing new drugs,
while maintaining the safely requirement in order to ensure the public health.
NDAs are covered by section 505 of the FDCA.3 The provisions
1Howard Kurtz, The Jaded Crusader, The Washington Post, December 15, 1994, at Dl.
Gingrich was quoted as saying that the FDA is the number one job killer in America.
2Michael Kinsley, The FDA: Too Cautious, Not Too Bold, Washington Post, August 10,
1989, at A25.
32l U.S.C. x 355 (1988).
1of that section prohibit the introduction into interstate commerce of new drugs
unless approved by the FDA.4 Approval may be refused by the Secretary if the
applicant falls to show the drug's safety or fails to submit substantial evidence
of the drug's ecacy. Such evidence, however, can only be garnered by animal
and clinical testing.5 The NDA itself generally consists of two to fteen volumes
of summary material of such testing and may be accompanied by as many as
200,000 pages of raw data.6 In 1980, the clinical testing stage of development
could last between seven and thirteen years and cost up to fty million dollars,
while the average time for the approval of an NDA was almost three years.7
It is dicult to determine exactly what percentage of this can be traced to
the ecacy requirement as opposed to the safety requirement. Nonetheless, it
remains clear that the ecacy requirement alone is a substantial factor.8
The FDCA as originally enacted in 1938 required only that a drug
be shown to be safe before being approved for commercial use. This original
NDA process was enacted in response to the elixir sulfanilarnide disaster, a
tragedy in which hundreds died from ingesting a drug whose liquid base was
poisonous.9 The Act required an applicant to submit the NDA accompanied
by the safety information, but allowed for automatic approval if the FDA failed
4Section 201(p) denes new drugs, inter alia, as [amy drug... the composition of which is
such that such drug is not generally recognized, among experts qualied by scientic training
and
5The clinical testing is allowed by an exemption in the statute falling under section 505(i),
known as the investigational new drug (IND) exemption.
6House Comm. on Science and Technology, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess., Report on The Food
and Drug Administrations's Process for Approving New Drugs (Comm. Print 1980).
7A more recent estimate cited in 53 Fed. Reg. 41,517 is that it takes an average of eight
years from animal testing to FDA approval.
8See infra section Ill-A.
9Richard.1. Nelson, Regulation of Investigational New Drugs: Giant Step for the Sick and
Dying?, 77 Georgetown L.J. 463, 468 (1988).
2experience to evaluate the safety and eectiveness of drugs, as safe and eec-
tive for use under the conditions prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the
labeling thereof... 21 U.S.C. x 321(p) (1988). to act within sixty days.10 In
1962, however, Congress passed the Drug Amendments in response to another
tragedy, the thalidomide tragedy that occurred in European countries.11 The
Drug Amendments did away with the system of automatic approval, but are
better known for adding the ecacy requirement to the NDA process.12 What
is sticking, though, is that this addition is really unrelated to the thalidomide
disaster, for that disaster was a result of an unsafe rather than an ineective
drug. The impetus for these amendments, as well as that for the original act,
was a concern over safety. Ecacy was never a primary concern. Through reg-
ulation the FDA has, in recent years, loosened the NDA requirements in certain
circumstances, generally for patients with life-threatening diseases. This trend
began in 1977 when the FDA initiated an informal policy called compassionate
INDs{ allowing terminal patients to procure IND drugs on an ad hoc basis,13
and culminated with the promulgation of a regulation regarding treatment (as
opposed to clinical) use of INDs in l987.14 In 1990, the FDA specically ad-
dressed the problem of NDA inexibility as it applied to AIDS when the FDA
announced a parallel track policy allowing for treatment use of AIDS INDs.15
Through these policies, the FDA has addressed the important though narrow
101d. at 469.
11Thalidomide, a tranquilizer prescribed to pregnant women to alleviate morning sickness,
caused birth defects in thousands of babies. Id.
121d. at 470. The amendments also instituted the [ND system.
131d. at 471.
142l C.F.R. x 312.34 (1987).
1555 Fed. Reg. 20856 (1990). The policy requires that the patient have no therapeutic
alternative
3problem of the so-called drug lag as it applies to terminal diseases. The policies
have the eect of allowing any terminal patient to obtain INDs prior to FDA
approval. and cannot participate in controlled clinical trials.
Therefore, one can argue that the ecacy requirement has already
been eliminated for such patients insofar as an experimental drug is still pending
NDA approval.
This paper, however, argues that we should go much further than
the FDA has in its recent liberalization of the NDA process. We should elim-
inate ecacy as an independent requirement for all new drugs, whatever the
seriousness of the targeted condition or the status of the NDA.16 Where a drug
is found safe, the government should stay out of the decision of an individual
and his doctor to proceed with its use. Three arguments support this proposal:
First, there are limited resources for the development of new drugs
and unnecessary regulations increase the cost of development, reducing the num-
ber of benecial drugs developed. Second, the notion of drug ecacy is one
that a marketplace can handle more eciently than a too cautious government
agency. Third, patients' privacy interests in choosing a method of treatment
should be respected. To put this proposal in a contemporary context I will
analyze how the NDA process works for two recent examples of questionably
ecacious drugs: the AIDS panacea, AL-721, and the hair-growth application,
minoxidil.
16This does not mean that ecacy would be completely irrelevant, for the FDA might still
consider it as a part of the safety determination. For instance, a drug which is not completely
safe may still be approved if it is very eective in treating a serious disease. Conversely, a
completely safe drug could not be denied approval because of its questionable ecacy.
4II.PREVIOUS ATTEMPTS AT JUDICIAL LIMITATION
Before addressing the specic arguments for eliminating the ecacy
requirement, I will summarize the relevant case law. The courts have generally
been unwilling to remove or limit the ecacy requirement as a matter of either
statutory or constitutional interpretation. The most celebrated case, United
States v. Rutherford, involved the unapproved cancer drug
Laetrile.17 The plainti class there argued that the 1962 amend-
ments should not be read to apply to terminal patients. Since they would die
without Laetrile anyhow, they contended, the protective policies behind the
amendments were not applicable. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that
the FDCA allowed the FDA to require a showing of ecacy as well as safety
for all drugs, including those intended to treat terminally-ill patients.18 The
amendments gave the discretion to the FDA, not to the patients, to decide
whether to insist on a showing of ecacy.19 In essence, the Court accepted the
FDA's argument that people may need to be protected from themselves.
The Rutherford decision was based completely on statutory grounds.
The constitutional validity of the ecacy requirement as applied to terminal or
non-terminal patients has never been squarely tested in the Supreme Court.20
However, in People v. Pnvuera the California Supreme Court held that the
constitutional right to privacy did not encompass the right of terminal cancer
17442 U.S. 544 (1979).
181d. at 552.
191d at 553-554.
20Though on remand, the 10th Circuit rejected the constitutional grounds, thus refusing to
extend the constitutional right to refuse medical treatment. 616 F.2d 455 (1980).
5patients to obtain Laetrile.21 It is fairly clear, therefore, that neither the Con-
stitution nor the FDCA forbids the application of the ecacy requirement to
drugs intended to treat terminal diseases. It follows from these decisions that
all drugs may be validly subjected to the ecacy requirement. Thus, it ap-
pears that the only available route to the requirement's elimination is through
legislative or regulatory action.
III.THE EFFICACY REQUIREMENT SHOULD BE ABANDONED
The simple reason for doing away with the ecacy requirement is
that its costs outweigh its benets. Michael Kinsley articulated the costs of the
NDA process:22 First, people die or suer while possibly benecial drugs await
FDA approval. Second, pharmaceutical companies never develop hypothetically
benecial drugs because the process is too costly. Third, actually benecial
drugs may never be approved because the FDA's standards are too high, i.e.,
the FDA is too cautious. I will not specically address Kinsley's rst cost in this
paper, because I believe it has largely been reduced by the treatment INT) and
parallel track IND policies instituted by the FDA.23 I will argue, however, that
the other two costs relating to drug development and the cost of the diminished
privacy rights of patients outweigh the benets associated with the ecacy
requirement. Those benets are (1) minimizing the expenditure of money spent
on ineective drugs, and (2) minimizing the medical costs of foregoing proven
treatments for ineective ones.
A.The NDA Process is Too Costly
21591 P.2d 919 (1979).
22Kinslev, supra note 2.
23See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
6As described above, the NDA process is a very lengthy and costly
one.24 Drug manufacturers, however, have limited resources to invest in ex-
perimental drugs. Therefore, one would ordinarily expect that the cheaper the
approval process, the more drugs would be developed. And the more drugs
developed, the more benecial drugs developed. To complete this syllogism, a
decrease in the cost of the process would lead to more benecial drugs. One
way of reducing costs is to eliminate the ecacy requirement.25 However, doing
so would also eliminate its benets. But I argue that such benets are largely
illusory. The truth is that the market would be likely to display a drug's ineec-
tiveness in a timely fashion without the help of the FDA. Competitors as well
as academics and medical journalists would point out and criticize the anemic
evidence of a drug's ecacy. Armed with such knowledge, patients would shy
away from using such a drug, and, anyhow, their physicians would be unlikely
to prescribe such drug's use. Therefore, since the safety of a new drug is ensured
by normal FDA standards, ecacy should be irrelevant.
Nonetheless, proponents of the ecacy requirement might argue
that the incremental cost of investigating ecacy once safety has been inves-
tigated is actually minimal. That argument contends that safety and ecacy
can be determined simultaneously with little additional cost, and, therefore, the
possible benets of the ecacy requirement should be preserved by retaining
that requirement. Such a claim would be wrong, however. Safety determina-
24See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
25Another way is to eliminate the safety requirement. That, however, is a harder argument
to make, for the osetting benets of the safety requirement are more easily observed than
the benets of the ecacy requirement.
7tions are made in the rst and second phases of clinical testing, while ecacy
determinations are made partly in the second and mostly in the third phases
of testing.26 Furthermore, the number of subjects in the third phase can be
hundreds of times greater than the number studied in the rst phase and tens
of times greater than those in the second phase.27 Therefore, it is clear that the
ecacy requirement, as an independent standard, forces drug manufacturers to
incur substantial and unnecessary extra costs.
B.The FDA is Too Cautious
There is something of a phenomenon of bureaucratic conservatism
in public agencies charged with protecting the health of Americans. Milton
Friedman explained this phenomenon as it applies to the FDA.28 He argued that
a risk averse FDA ocial would rather make the mistake of refusing approval
of a what is actually a safe and eective drug that would have saved lives, than
approving what turns out to be an unsafe or ineective drug that results in
death or serious injury. Therefore, the FDA enters the NDA process with a bias
against approval. It is a combination of this risk aversion and the unfettered
discretion of the FDA that may exact a high cost in terms of human lives.
Though such an observation may not be a good argument for doing away with
the system completely, it does suggest that FDA discretion should be reduced
where possible. Since this paper displays that the marginal benets of the
ecacy requirement, if any, are small, it follows that we should reduce the
FDA's discretion by eliminating that requirement.
26Nelson, supra note 9, at 470-471.
271d
28Milton Friedman, Frustrating Drug Advancement, Newsweek, January 8, 1973, at 49.
8A further problem with the existing discretion the FDA has under
the ecacy requirement is that ecacy is too dicult to prove by substantial
evidence.29 A determination of ecacy for certain drugs may not be available
until the drug has achieved widespread general usage, long after Phase III studies
are completed.30 Furthermore, where experts have attempted to determine
ecacy at the clinical stage, they have been surprisingly unable to accurately
assess false-positive and false-negative ndings.31 The main problem, though, is
that the FDA is institutionally incompetent to determine ecacy. The agency
has no controlling principles on which to base such decisions, and, in any case, it
has no expertise to apply those principles. Therefore, we should let the medical
profession and the market deal with the question of ecacy. For even without
the FDA's supervision, there is no reason to fear that ineective drugs will
prosper since competitors are free to question ecacy and doctors are obligated
to do the same.
C.The Individual's Privacy Interests Outweigh those of the Gov-
ernment
Probably the most important reason for doing away with the e-
cacy requirement is that it interferes with the right of a patient to control his
own course of treatment. Although such a right is not embedded in the Con-
29Section 505(d) denes substantial evidence as evidence consisting of adequate and well-
controlled investigations, including clinical investigations, by experts qualied by scientic
training and experience to evaluate the eectiveness of the drug involved, on the basis of
which it could fairly and responsibly be concluded by such experts that the drug will have the
eect it purports or is
30Margaret Salmon Rivas, The California Aids Initiative and the Food and Drug Adminis-
tration:
31Katherine M. Atikian, Nasty Medicine, 27 Loy. L.A. L.R. 1513, 1532-1533 (June 1994).
9stitution,32 it is an interest that we should respect where possible. If a drug is
proven safe, non-addictive, and non-impairing, then the represented to have un-
der the conditions of use prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the labeling
or proposed labeling thereof.
Working at Odds with Each Other?, 46 Food Drug Cosm. L.J.
107, 117 (January 1991). government has no signicant countervailing interest
in preventing its use. The only possible interests the government could claim
are parens patriae, protection against fraud, and control of national health care
expenditures. The rst interest goes to the question of whether an individual
can assess for himself, with the counsel of a doctor, the costs and benets of
proceeding with an unproven treatment. Where an individual is informed about
the unproven traits of a drug versus the proven, though less than ideal, alter-
native treatments, the decision of which road to choose is best left to him. For
that reason, a patient may decide to undergo an experimental surgical proce-
dure without government intrusion, and the surgeon's only restrictions on going
forward with such an operation are malpractice liability and peer review. As
to the government's interest in protecting patients from fraud, I have already
argued that the market and the medical profession are better able than a public
agency to guard against false claims of ecacy.33 Further, the physician's duty
to give informed consent ensures that his patients will be apprised of the relative
merits of competing drugs or of the unproven ecacy of a prescribed drug.
32See supra section II. Though, in a strong dissent in Privitera, Judge Byrd argued that
each individual [canceri patient has the right to obtain the substance [laetrilej from a licensed
physician who feels it appropriate to prescribe it to him, as long as the substance is safe. 591
P.2d 919, 927 (1979).
33See also infra section VI.
10Proponents of the ecacy requirement may nonetheless argue that
the requirement is necessary in an insurance-funded health care system such as
ours. In such a system patients will not internalize the costs of using experi-
mental drugs; therefore, the argument goes, we need the ecacy requirement
to limit health care expenditures to those treatments that are medically nec-
essary and eective. Such an argument ignores two important facts, however.
First, insurance policies are not required to cover experimental treatments in
general, and, for example, Medicaid does not.34 Second, doctors still have to
prescribe the drug. It is this second fact that will act as the greatest barrier
to the potentially wasteful expenditure of money on drugs of unproven ecacy,
for physicians will not be apt to prescribe experimental drugs except in unusual
circumstances. Anyhow, the ability of third-party payors to remove such drugs
from their coverage ensures that expenditures will be limited.
IV.AIDS AND THE EGG-YOLK PANACEA
The well-publicized furor over the experimental and unapproved
AIDS drug AL-72 1 displays why we should eliminate the ecacy requirement.
A.L-72 1 is an egg-yolk derivative which was sold as a food supplement by
Ethigen, a small Los Angeles company, to people with AIDS.35 Advocates of
AL-721 claimed that the substance retards the ability of the AIDS virus to infect
cells.36 Though the substance is harmless, it has never been shown to have any
34Angela R. Holder, Funding Innovative Medical Treatment, 57 Albany Law Review 795,
803 (1994).
35Elizabeth Sanger, Anti-AIDS Substance May Go on Sale Soon, Newsday, April 19, 1988,
at 43. AL-72 I is not subject to NDA approval because the FDA has considered it to be a
food supplement rather than a drug.
36Lee Ann Dean, Acquired Immune Deciency Syndrome, Viatical Settlement, and the
Health Care Crisis , 25 Rutgers L.J. 117, 125 n. 36 (1993).
11eect on the AIDS virus and has been discredited by most experts.37 For the
purpose of this discussion, I will assume that AL-721 should be subjected to
NDA approval despite its status as a food supplement.
For a disease such as AIDS, the only hope for a cure is a shot in
the dark. However, the heavy costs imposed by the ecacy requirement on
pharmaceutical companies makes it unlikely that such companies will go ahead
with any testing of a questionable candidate drug, although such a drug may
have otherwise turned out to be the one Therefore, the ecacy requirement has
a direct eect on limiting the number of experimental AIDS drugs that may
go through all phases of clinical testing. For example, say AL-72 1 is being
presently developed and tested. Chances are it would be abandoned in an early
phase of clinical testing by the manufacturer because of equivocal results. Thus,
money would be saved (for we really know that the drug would turn out to be
ineective here). Such a result would be merely fortuitous, however, because
the decision to cancel testing would not have been based solely on the merits
of the results. Rather, the decision would have been articially inuenced by
the extra costs required to show ecacy by substantial evidence. If one accepts
the market theory, then such a decision, though correct in the result, can be
considered fallacious in the process.
Ethigen also would be likely to abandon AL-721 at an early phase
of testing because of the high standards of the ecacy requirement and the
FDA's overcautiousness. Knowing beforehand of the substantial evidence re-
37Gina Kolata, Strange Saga of AL 721, San Francisco Chronicle, June 27, 1988, at AS.
12quirement and the wide discretion of the FDA, Ethigen would be hesitant to
expend resources on the drug without some early hard proof of ecacy. Again,
that would be the correct result here, though it shows how the process is awed
in general. And even if Ethigen were to allow AL-721 to go through the com-
plete NDA process, the NDA's eventual denial would represent a substantial
waste of money that could have been spent on developing another candidate
drug for AIDS treatment.
Finally, the ecacy requirement makes no sense as applied to AL-72
1 because it is an unnecessary interference with the privacy interests of people
with AIDS. As discussed above, the use of truly ineective drugs will most
likely wane in time as such information is disseminated.38 In any case, terminal
patients, such as people with AIDS, should not be denied the hope of a miracle
cure as long as the drug is safe and the patients are not deceived about the
actual chances that the drug will lead to recovery. It cannot be claimed here
that the government is protecting these people from themselves, for they will die
one way or another. Therefore, the government has no countervailing interests
to the assumed privacy interests of the individual.
V.HAIR GROWTH FROM HEART MEDICATION
The Upjohn Co. discovered in 1984 that its blood pressure medicine
called minoxidil might aid in curing or preventing baldness.39 The FDA ap-
proved the substance, called Rogaine, as a prescription scalp application, though
385ee supra section Ill-A. For example, by 1990 most advocates for the use of experimental
AIDS drugs had shied away from supporting the use of AL-721. Elaine Herscher, Book Review,
San Francisco Chronicle, October 28, 1990, at 5.
39Mary Graneld, At a Glance the Bald Truth About Minoxidil, Money Magazine, April
1989, at87.
13it was revealed that Rogaine could only work for men with hair thinning on top
and, by the best estimate, for only 39% of those men.40 The drug has been
found harmless if not very eective at curing baldness.41
1987, at 1,5,5.
The ecacy requirement places a high cost on the balding as it
does on the AIDS-stricken. The disease or disfunction is largely irrelevant. If
there is any dierence, though, the argument should be even stronger for a
drug like Rogaine whose intended eect is merely cosmetic. Why should the
FDA be concerned in any way with an individual's decision to spend his own
money on a treatment with no medical downside as long as he is informed by
the manufacturer or his doctor of the low rate of success?42 Baldness is not
a trivial problem to many people, though objectively less serious than other
medical conditions. In requiring a manufacturer to show ecacy by substantial
evidence, the cure for baldness, if one exists, may be passed over just as the
cure for AIDS may have already been dismissed as ineective. Further, the
extra expense to prove the eectiveness of Rogaine might have been better spent
on research for another baldness medication or, perhaps, an AIDS drug. Once
again, drug companies have limited resources and money spent on documenting
ecacy studies for the benet of the FDA is inevitably taken from another
40John Langone, Gone Today, Hair Tomorrow, Time, August 29, 1988, at 78. Though
according to an FDA advisory panel member, only 15% of men would grow enough hair to
make a visible dierence, and a year's supply could cost $600. Hair-Raising News, Time,
March 30, 1987, at 62.
41John Sansing, Minoxidil Falls Short as Miracle Baldness Cure, Los Angeles Times, August
10,
42Since Rogaine is likely to retain its prescription status there is no real worry that misin-
formation by Upjohn would not be rectied by physician consultation. Panel Advises FDA
Not to OK Over-the-Counter Rogaine Sales, Star Tribune, July 28, 1994, at SA.
14endeavor.
In the case of Rogaine, the conservatism of the FDA did not lead
to a refusal to approve the drug for prescription use. Nonetheless, that agency's
overcautiousness and the inordinately high standard it has for new drug ap-
proval contribute to the problems discussed above. The cost of testing and
documenting the drug's ecacy was articially heightened relative to what the
marketplace would have required. In eect, Upjohn was forced to test the
substance on about 5,000 subjects to determine ecacy where a much smaller
number might have been sucient, and an even smaller number necessary to
determine safety.43 The result of such conservatism is that either a possibly ef-
fective drug will be precluded from the marketplace, or it will be allowed entry
only after an unnecessary premium is attached to it.
Even if Rogaine were shown to be completely ineective, the gov-
ernment should not interfere with an individual's physician-informed decision
to use the substance. This privacy argument is strongest for cosmetic drugs,
such as Rogaine, because there is no worry that the patient may be hurt by
foregoing a more eective alternative (though I have argued above that such a
worry also does not justify government intrusion). Again, the market and the
medical profession will enlighten patients about false cures, especially for break-
through medications that are likely to be widely publicized. And the ability of
government and private insurers to remove such drugs from coverage and force
patients to pay for them out-of-pocket means that such drugs' purchases will
43Sansing, supra note 41.
15not be improvident. Furthermore, the FDA is not competent to decide whether
Rogaine is eective. Would a 5% success rate justify use? Would a 1% rate
do it? Does it matter that the medication must be used for life to preserve
any growth?44 Should the high cost of its use play a part in assessing ecacy?
Since the drug is safe, these are questions that should be answered privately
and personally. They are not questions best left to experts or bureaucrats. q
VI.IN THE CASE OF MARKET FAILURE
The previous analysis is dependent on the existence of a well-
functioning market. Such a market cannot always be counted on, though. Drug
patents create monopolies and the medical profession cannot oversee the in-
troduction of every substance. Further, physicians may be misinformed and
patients ignorant. The lack of regulation under such circumstances may lead to
the triumph of actually ineective drugs, at least for a time. If drug companies
could predict such market failures, then they might be tempted to make a quick
buck by falsely stating their drugs' ecacy. One might argue from this that the
ecacy requirement is an integral and necessary part of new drug approval.
For six reasons, however, the possibility of such a market failure
does not mean that ineective drugs would prosper. First, even without an
ecacy requirement the FDA has a very strong weapon to battle what it thinks
are ineective drugs. That weapon is publicity. For instance, when Upjohn
issued an overly optimistic report of Rogaine's eectiveness in 1986, the FDA
countered with a press release questioning the report's validity.45 The FDA's
44Langone, supra note 40.
45Sansing, supra note 41.
16action caused a drop in the value of Upjohn's stock and, presumably, helped
to correct the market failure46 Second, the FDA can attack companies for false
claims of ecacy on a drug's labeling.47 Such an attack may include the issuance
of an injunction,48 the imposition of criminal penalties,49 and the seizure of the
misbranded drugs.50 The existence of such sanctions should deter companies
from making false representations despite a market failure.
Third, the Federal Trade Commission can sue under section 53(a)
of the Federal Trade Commission Act to enjoin advertisements relating to false
claims of drug ecacy.51 Fourth, private parties can sue drug manufacturers un-
der section 43(a) of the Lanham Act for damages caused by false representations
made in the labeling or commercial advertising of such drugs.52 Fifth, state and
federal criminal fraud prohibitions should deter companies from knowingly or
recklessly overstating the ecacy of drugs. Finally, the argument for the elim-
ination of the ecacy requirement does not preclude the enactment of other
measures designed to protect the public from ineective drugs, as long as such
measures do not require a pre-market showing of ecacy. For instance, Congress
could require that questionably ecacious drugs declare that uncertainty on
their labels, with the failure to do so constituting misbranding. Congress could
also enact new and harsher penalties for misbranding. Anyhow, an elimination
of pre-market ecacy approval, even in the face of a market failure, does not
46Id.
47Section 502(a) of the FDCA deems a drug misbranded [i]f its labeling is false or misleading
in any particular. 21 U.S.C. x 352(a) (1988).
4821 U.S.C. x 332 (1988).
4921 U.S.C. x 333 (1988).
5021 U.S.C. x 334 (1988).
5118 U.S.C. x 53(a) (1988).
5215 U.S.C. x 1125(a) (1988).
17leave drug companies free to make unsubstantiated claims of ecacy.
VII. CONCLUSION
The costs imposed by overregulation are not just felt in the trea-
sury or in the gross national product numbers. They are discernable in the lives
of the sick and dying, of the suering, and even of the balding. When such costs
can be diminished without an osetting diminution in benets, we should act
accordingly. In eliminating the ecacy requirement for new drug approval we
would achieve such a net gain. The market, the prescription drug requirements,
and the post-approval requirements of the FDCA already ensure that only ef-
fective drugs will prosper. The use of limited resources to document ecacy
studies for the benet of the FDA is thus a waste. Such resources could other-
wise be conserved for testing as many drug candidates as possible. One could
argue that there would be an even greater net benet if the safety requirement
were to be eliminated as well as the ecacy requirement. Such an argument
may have merit, because the market principles that apply to ecacy would be
enhanced by tort principles { though an unsafe drug may exact such a high cost
on patients that such safeguards would not be sucient. Either way, the case
against the ecacy requirement is clear, and that is as good a place as any to
begin the downsizing of government.
18